‘A relational approach to supervision’: Some reflections on supervision from an existential-phenomenological perspective by Plock, Simon Du
The invitation to contribute a paper to Análise
Psicológica, and my involvement, particularly in
relation to clinical supervision, in the newly-
launched Mestrado Relação de Ajuda – Perspectivas
da Psicoterapia Existencial at the Instituto Superior
de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, prompts me to
reflect on what might be primarily a useful offering
and likely to stimulate further discussion either
in the pages of this journal, in the context of the
MA Programme, or both.
While a paper along the lines of ‘What is
existential-phenomenological therapy?’, or
something similar could certainly prove fruitful,
what I personally find of particular interest and
significance when thinking about therapeutic
relationship is the almost complete lack of attention
which has been given in the existential-phenome-
nological literature to the nature of the supervisory
relationship appropriate for existential practitioner.
When I undertook a literature search in 2004, (I
will say more about my reasons for doing so shortly),
I found no specific or single model of existential-
phenomenological supervision emerged from the
very little which has been published. At this point
there existed just three articles in peer-reviewed
journals, no dedicated texts or book chapters, no
specific training videos, and only a handful of
Masters-level dissertations touching on this topic.
I was able to locate a single (unpublished) PhD
thesis on the subject by a student in New Mexico.
Turning to PSYCHINFO, I obtained in excess of
10,000 hits with both ‘supervision’ and ‘existential
therapy’ separately – but in conjunction I obtained
only three hits.
The most recent paper was published four
years ago (Mitchell, 2002), but has not sparked
further discussion in the journal where it appeared.
This is especially curious given the tenor of each
of the articles, which was that we have only the
sketchiest understanding of existential supervision
and little agreement exists about how it should
be facilitated. These articles had rather the tone of
‘position papers’, each positing tentative suggestions
about existential supervision. The motive in each
case seemed to be a desire to identify a way forward
congruent with the core characteristics of existential
therapy. Mitchell, for example, highlights the significance
for existential supervision of existential ways of
understanding relatedness. Pett (1995) draws attention
to the need to use a supervisory framework (rather
than a formal model) which is flexible enough to
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utilize existential insights. Wright argues that the
non-doctrinaire nature of existential-phenomeno-
logical supervision is both its greatest strength
and its greatest weakness:
I both envy and am wary of the more steady
certainty offered by other approaches, and
resent but also trust the continual uncertainty
that goes with existentialism. (1996, p. 154)
Do we find any explicit consideration of
existential-phenomenological supervision in recent
texts? To my surprise the answer would seem to
be we do not. While supervision might occasionally
be mentioned as a backdrop to clinical work, there
is no discussion of the form it might take in Cooper
(2003), or in van Deurzen and Arnold-Baker (Eds.)
(2005): texts written by and for existential practitioners
are largely silent on the issue. Perhaps all that
was needful was said in earlier texts? Leaving
aside the absurdity of the notion that it would be
possible to ‘fix’ the nature of this aspect of existential
work in such a manner, a survey of publications
since 1985 yields nothing significant, and I must
include my own edited text (du Plock, 1997), in
these findings. Even van Deurzen’s extensive account
of her work with ‘Laura’ – probably the case
study most frequently referred to in UK training
programmes – omits mention of supervision.
The reader does not know whether there is a
supervisor, or whether the work is informed by
reflection and self-supervision (van Deurzen, 1997).
This situation is surprising since we know that
supervision is an established aspect of clinical
practice and a requirement in the UK of the United
Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) and
the British Association for Counselling and Psycho-
therapy (BACP). Participation in supervision –
often both in clinical placement and training institution
– is a core component of existential therapy training.
Moreover, graduates of these trainings are frequently
required by employing agencies to provide clinical
supervision in turn. The question arises: what sort
of supervision do these existential practitioners
offer?
Speaking from my own experience, I found as
a senior practitioner and trainer that I was expected
to supervise as part of my contract of employment
with the School of Psychotherapy and Counselling.
While members of visiting faculty might supervise
but not teach, permanent faculty were expected
to both teach and supervise. What, in fact, has
operated has been a sort of apprenticeship system
according to which those who have successfully
completed a therapy training (which, of course,
included the experience of being a supervisee)
are deemed able themselves to supervise. On the
basis of this I have, for many years, supervised
in the UK National Health Service, (NHS), as
well as for a number of private and charitable
organizations. So clinical supervision features as
a core component of my curriculum vitae even
though I have never undertaken any formal training
in the field, and it is possible I never will.
It does so, but when I reflect on it, it feels
somewhat problematic because it is not practice
which is informed explicitly by a well-recognized,
constantly debated, and regularly revised body
of theory. I think that this position is a vulnerable
one, not least because we teach and practice in
an environment increasingly (and I would say
often detrimentally) in thrall to quality assurance
agendas, and to the neurotic ‘evidencing’ of educa-
tional aims and learning outcomes which frequently
stifles the artistry of therapy. The greater the demand,
the more pressing is the need to be able to stand
by what we do in practice.
Some years ago I wrote a formal proposal for
a Masters-level training programme in existential-
phenomenological supervision. I never presented
it: ‘political’ factors intervened and the conditions
for such an innovation were suddenly not available.
The research I undertook to prepare the document
involved me in looking at supervision per se –
going back to the roots, both historical and
etymological, of the supervisory endeavour. In some
respects this was a similar process to that of existential
therapy itself, where we are concerned to engage
with the client in a piece of co-research to clarify
the way the client creates meaning. In the course
of this research I became more aware of the way
supervision was historically connected with
psychoanalytic training, how it has developed
over time, and the ways in which supervision
increasingly constitutes itself as an independent
profession with a distinctive knowledge base.
I do not propose to go into any of this further
here: my purpose is rather to ask where our
unreflected-upon existential-phenomenological
supervision sits in relation to these developments?
Is there not something fundamentally bizarre about
a therapeutic practice which makes strenuous claims
to be different from others, which, indeed, is often
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portrayed and often portrays itself, as antagonistic
to, or able to provide a strong critique of, other
approaches, but which makes no similar claim
itself in relation to so fundamental a component
of practice as supervision?
My experience leads me to believe that, while
little may have been written, there is a growing
grass-roots interest in addressing these questions.
I delivered a paper ‘Clinical Supervision from
the Humanistic and Existential Perspectives: A
Comparison’ at the first Vilnius University Conference
on Existential Psychology, Lithuania, in 1997.  The
conference was held in response to the resurgence
in the Baltic States of existential therapy after the
withdrawal in 1991 of Russian rule, and a concurrent
wish to find alternatives to biological Soviet psychiatry.
The energy and enthusiasm of debate at the conference
was symptomatic of the need which existential
therapists felt also to claim their own intellectual
space, and this gave rise to a major congress in
2000 entitled ‘Existential Therapy and the Post-
Soviet Person’. Since then I have been invited to
supervise in each of the Baltic States, and also in
the Russian Federation.
I began this paper by saying that I wanted to
offer something useful. The most useful thing, to
my mind, at this point in the development of existential-
phenomenological supervision, is to sketch out a
practical way of engaging with the territory. I do
not think the most helpful route is via a detailed
discussion of the way supervision is used by other
therapeutic orientations, (though I am open to the
possibility that I may be quite wrong in this); rather,
I propose we take the opportunity which the lack
of published material constitutes to ask what we,
the practitioners, want ‘existential-phenomenological
supervision’ to signify. Accordingly, I set out below
in note form the outline of a two-day Intensive
Workshop I facilitated for the East European Association
for Existential Therapy, and gave at the Institute
for Humanistic and Existential Therapy in Lithuania
in 2004. I employed a similar format with a group
of clinical psychologists training in existential
therapy in Denmark in 2005. In each case my
intention was to facilitate a co-research journey,
honouring the fundamental phenomenological aim
to ‘return to the things themselves’. If I depart
from the standard format for an academic paper
in doing so, I do so intentionally. The workshop
is designed to open up a space of ‘un-knowing’
in which participants can, via experiential exercises,
become more fully aware of their personal needs
and desires, wishes and fantasies in relation to
clinical supervision. My intention is to open up a
space, rather than fill a space with references to
pre-existing theories.
Naturally an outline cannot capture the dynamism
and excitement of a group of practitioners exploring
this topic, and in doing so weaving a rich tapestry
of storying and re-storying supervision, but I hope
this framework will encourage others to develop
experiential ways of investigating the meanings
they bring to the notion of supervision and, in
doing so, gain a deeper sense of what they want
supervision to be.
Indented passages reproduce the notes I used
to contextualize each experiential exercise. Though
I have not referenced them, the material I am
drawing upon will be evident to any existential-
phenomenological practitioner. Keywords upon
which I placed particular emphasis when talking
to the workshop participants are underlined.
INTENSIVE WORKSHOP ON
EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL
SUPERVISION – SCHEDULE
DAY 1
This is not going to be a complete guide to
existential-phenomenological supervision – it
cannot hope to be given our time limitations.
Any case a ‘how to’ approach is inimical to the
existential-phenomenological approach.
I am going to suggest some ways in which we
can undertake the important activity of supervision
infused with the values of existential-phenome-
nological therapy.
Some of what I suggest may sit oddly with your
conceptions, or for all I know with how existential-
phenomenological supervision is envisaged and
taught here. I will be interested to learn about this
if it is the case – in fact I will be astonished if it
is not the case.
I introduce myself and outline what I propose
as the major focus/activities of the two days. Introduce
the first experiential exercise, an introductory exercise
undertaken in pairs and then in the context of the
whole group.
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Exercise 1
Find yourself a partner, preferably not someone
you came with today or already know well.
Each of you takes seven minutes to introduce
yourself to the other, say whatever you think may
be relevant for the next two days with regard to
their experience of being a supervisee (and supervisor,
if appropriate);
the extent to which you find this supervision
supportive/not supportive of existential-pheno-
menological practice;
what you hope to achieve during this workshop.
Return to the large group, and introduce each
other.
Make a note of your aim so that you can see
the extent to which you have realized it by the
end of the workshop.
Talk participants through the proposed structure
on OHP and incorporate/list alternatives, particular
issues they raise for discussion.
Introduce second exercise, an exploration of
the ‘situated self’ in triads/fours, drawing on relevant
literature including the work of Rollo May.
Exercise 2
Get into triads/fours – again, try to work with
at least some people you do not know well – and
take turns.
One person is supervisor, the others are supervisees.
Supervisor asks one supervisee where the supervisee
is? Whoever has been asked this question will
take the next turn to be supervisor and repeat the
exercise.
Think about how you come to be here today
(perhaps relating this to the introductory exercise).
What is preoccupying you? Where are you in
your world? How available are you in the session?
This will take 30+ minutes. Use any remaining
time to feedback in the large group.
Whole group discussion of the experience of
engaging with Exercise Two.
Introduce the third exercise, the ‘here-is-a-new-
person’ exercise, in triads/fours.
Exercise 3
Get into triads/fours – the same group as for
the previous exercise if you wish.
One person is supervisor, the others are supervisees.
Supervisor invites one supervisee to reflect 10 minutes
on the concept of here-is-a-new-person I whatever
way or context it is important to them – in therapeutic
practice, or in private life and intimate relationships.
After each person has worked, the group takes
five minutes to reflect on whatever has come up
as a consequence of hearing the speaker’s material.
Come back to the whole group to consider the
experience of Exercise Three briefly, then introduce
the notion of the subjective experience of being
supervised and introduce fourth exercise: the ‘shame’
exercise.
Exercise 4
In triads/fours – keep to the group you were in
for the last exercise. Each person sharing takes
10 minutes.
Each takes responsibility in turn for sharing
something (preferably not from your work as a
therapist) which is a secret – something you would
not normally choose to disclose.
It may or may not feel ‘shameful’. It may be
something you are ambivalent about or secretly
proud of.
Those listening should be appropriately attentive
and respectful, perhaps supportive of exploring
what is difficult in the material for their colleague.
We have an hour – please use remaining time
for reflection on each of the sessions.
DAY 2
Check in and introduce Exercise Five: The ‘your
specialness’ exercise.
Exercise 5
In triads. Each person speaking takes 10 minutes.
Other group members take 5 minutes to reflect
on the experience of hearing the speaker’s story.
Ask yourself: what special thing do you bring
to your supervision?
Perhaps there is something you would like to
bring but feel you are not secure enough to bring?
Try to bring it to this exercise.
If this feels too risky, try to talk about the feeling
of riskiness and imagine what it might feel like/the
difference it would make were you able to bring
it.
Introduce next exercise.
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Exercise 6/7
In fours. Two people are supervisor in each of
the two periods of time allocated. Each works for
20 minutes with 10 minutes after each session for
reflection.
The object of the exercise is for the supervisor
(and those supervisees not speaking about their
work) to focus on the process (the shape, rhythm,
movement, energy) which unfolds as the supervisee
tells their story.
Having observed the process, the supervisor
attempts to reflect on it with the group towards
the end of the available time.
Each participant reflects on the impact of this
on their conception of the therapeutic alliance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I am not offering a ‘conclusion’ as such since
it is my intention that my musings on the notion
of existential-phenomenological supervision
may be part of an on-going process of reflection
in the existential-phenomenological therapy
community as a whole. My experience suggests
that experiential work of the type I have outlined
can provide a context for such creative reflection. I
do not think it particularly contentious to argue
that we need to establish the characteristics of
that form of clinical supervision most appropriate
to support our distinctive way of working with
clients. Notions of relationship, encounter and
meaning-making are central to the existential-
phenomenological therapeutic alliance; I would
contend that we need to find ways of ensuring that
they occupy a similar position in the supervisory
alliance. It seems to me that we can achieve this
by conceptualising supervision as a piece of practical
research into our openness to and limitations on
being in relationship with clients. In such an approach
the supervisor and supervisees become co-researchers
of the phenomenon ‘relationship’.
REFERENCES
Cooper, M. (2003). Existential Therapies. London: Sage.
du Plock, S. (Ed.) (1997). Case Studies in Existential
Psychotherapy and Counselling. Chichester: Wiley
& Sons.
May, R., Angel, E., & Ellenberger, H. F. (Eds.) (1958).
Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and
Psychology. New York: Basic Books.
Mitchell, D. (2000). Is the Concept of Supervision at
Odds with Existential Thinking and Therapeutic
Practice? Existential Analysis, 13 (1), 91-97.
Pett, J. (1995). A Personal Approach to Existential
Supervision. Existential Analysis, 6 (2), 117-126.
van Deurzen, E., & Arnold-Baker C. (Eds.) (2005).
Existential Perspectives on Human Issues. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
van Deurzen, E. (1997). Everyday Mysteries. London:
Routledge.
Wright, R. (1996). Another Approach to Existential
Supervision. Existential Analysis, 7 (1), 149-158.
ABSTRACT
This paper draws attention to the dearth of information
on clinical supervision in the existential-phenomeno-
logical literature. It suggests that this should be of concern
to existential trainers and practitioners since it seems
indicative of a lack of the reflectiveness and clarity
which are at the core of existential-phenomenological
practice. The author proposes an experiential approach
to this situation which utilizes some aspects of existential
therapy to facilitate exploration of the concept of ‘supervision’
per se from an existential perspective. The author reminds
us of the centrality of relationship in existential-phenome-
nological therapy, particularly in the form of healing
encounter espoused by Buber and the equality of client
and therapist engaged in an investigation of the difficulties
in living which is proposed by Heidegger. In doing so,
the author raises the possibility that an ‘attitude’ to,
rather than a model for, existential-phenomenological
supervision may emerge which takes relationship as its
primary focus: he describes this as a ‘relational approach
to supervision’.
Key words: Relationship, existential, phenomenology,
supervision, experiential.
RESUMO
Este texto chama a atenção para a falta de informação
sobre a supervisão clínica na bibliografia fenomenológica
existencial. Sugere que esta deve ser motivo de preocupação
para os formadores e profissionais visto que parece
indicativo de falta de reflexão e clareza que estão no
centro da prática fenomenológica existencial. O autor
propõe uma abordagem baseada na experiência a esta
situação, que utiliza alguns aspectos da terapia existencial
para facilitar a exploração do conceito de supervisão
per se numa perspectiva existencial. O autor relembra-nos
da centralidade da relação na terapia fenomenológica
existencial, particularmente na forma de sarar confrontos
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defendidos por Buber e a igualdade do cliente e terapeuta
envolvidos numa investigação das dificuldades em viver
que é proposta por Heidegger. Ao proceder assim, o
autor suscita a possibilidade que uma ‘atitude em relação
à supervisão fenomenológica existencial mais do que
um modelo pode emergir que toma a relação como o seu
principal enfoque: descreve isto como uma abordagem
relacionada com a supervisão”.
Palavras-chave: Relação, existencial, fenomenologia,
supervisão, experiencial.
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